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LEGITIMACY, LEGALITY, LEGACY, AND THE LIFE OF
DEMOCRACY
Joshua Ulan Galperin*
The Trump Administration challenged notions of good governance. It
challenged our expectation of majoritarian legitimacy to the extent only a
minority of voters elected President Donald Trump in 2016.1 It challenged
our demands for reasoned decision-making insofar as the President sought
to dismantle the administrative state and govern by fiat.2 It challenged our
expectation of checks and balances in the way it approached appointments
and removals to accumulate power at the expense of congressional design.3
These challenges sound in different legal theories, but they all reflect
shattered expectations of good governance. And yet, the most lasting legacy
of the Trump Administration may have nothing to do with governing. It is
hard to guess how historians will view this period, but I write and revise
this essay in December 2020 and Spring 2021, having watched the most
flamboyant, stunning, and blatant attempt to prostrate the United States'
electoral system. 4 This flagging has raised concerns about the continuing
legitimacy of democracy. But this concern reflects a simplistic and
mistaken view of democracy. In fact, democracy remains the solution-not
* Assistant Professor of Law, Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University; M.E.M,
2009, Yale School of the Environment; J.D., 2007, Vermont Law School; B.A., University of Delaware,
2004.
1. See
2016
Presidential
Election
Results,
N.Y.
TIMEs,
https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/president (last updated Aug. 9, 2017) (showing the
election results wherein Hillary Clinton lost the election with 48% of the popular vote and Donald
Trump won with just 45.9%).
2. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13843, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,755-56 (July 10, 2018) (altering the
hiring rules and examinations of Administrative Law Judges); Exec. Order No. 13957, 85 Fed. Reg.
67631-32 (Oct. 26, 2020) (promulgating an executive order to alter the hiring process for federal
employees with access to confidential information).
3. E.g., Brief for Petitioner at 2, 4-5, 15, 19, 30, Seila Law v. Con. Fin. Protection Bureau,
140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020); Brief for Respondent at 45, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
4. See Where Republicans in Congress Stand on Trump's False Claim of Winning the
Election, WASH. POST https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/congress-republicanstrump-election-claims/ (last updated Dec. 15, 2020) (reporting that Trump incorrectly claimed he won
the presidential election, and that over 200 Republicans refused to acknowledge Joe Biden as the victor
in the 2020 presidential election).
5. Henry Farrel, Trump's Baseless Claims Damage American Democracy, WASH. POST
(Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/11/05/trumps-baseless-claims-damageamerican-democracy/; Sam Levine, 'Corrosive to Democracy': What Do Trump's Baseless Claims
Really
Mean?
THE
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
13,
2020)
https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2020/nov/13/trump-election-voter-fraud-claims-attack-democracy; Jeet Heer, Even a Clownish
Coup
Can
Still
Hurt
Democracy,
THE
NATION
(Nov.
18,
2020),
https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/trump-coup-election-michigan/,
Michael Peel, Trump 's
Attack
on
US
Democracy
Hurts
Everyone,
FIN.
TIMES
(Nov.
19,
2020),
https://www.ft.com/conten/4345612c-6826-40de-a9f2-a97e7e9725d0.
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the problem. The problem lies in the fact that elections alone do not make a
democracy. The solution lies in the complexity of our constitutional
arrangement, which despite staggeringly selfish attacks on the electoral
process, maintains some stability.
It hardly needs repeating. President Trump all but promised that he
would not accept defeat in the 2020 presidential election. 6 On election
night, before all the votes were counted, President Trump declared himself
the winner.7 As the vote counting continued over the following days, the
President and his followers at times demanded that vote counting should
stop and at other times that it should continue. In places such as Michigan,
where outstanding ballots significantly favored Joe Biden, the President or
his supporters called for an end to counting.8 In places such as in Arizona,
where there was more likelihood that uncounted ballots would favor
President Trump, Donald Trump's supporters demanded that counting
continue. 9 By the end of the week it was clear that Joe Biden had amassed a
significant majority of the national vote and had won key states necessary
for a victory in the Electoral College. 10 Yet President Trump and his allies
declared that massive voter fraud had stolen the election." Meanwhile, state
and federal election officials insisted the election was fair and secure.12
Christopher Krebs, then-Head of the Department of Homeland Security's
Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency-charged with election
security-declared that the 2020 presidential election was secure and free

6. See Kevin Liptak, A List of the Times Trump Has Said He Won't Accept the Election
Results or Leave Office if He Loses, CNN (Sep. 24, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/24/politics
(detailing multiple occasions former President
/trump-election-warnings-leaving-office/index.html
Trump claimed he would not cede the 2020 election or give up office).
7. Christina Wilkie, Trump Tries to Claim Victory Even as Ballots Are Being Counted in
Several States, CNBC (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/04/trump-tries-to-claim-victoryeven-as-ballots-are-being-counted-in- several- states-nbc-has-not-made-a-call.html.
8. Bill Bostock, Videos Show Trump ProtestorsChanting 'Count Those Votes' and 'Stop the
Count' Outside Separate Ballot-CountingSites in Arizona and Michigan, Bus. INSIDER (Nov. 5, 2020),
https://www.businessinsider.com/videos-trump-protesters-michigan-arizona-vote-count-2020-11.
9. Id.
10. Jonathan Lemire et al., Biden Defeats Trump for White House, Says 'Time to Heal,'
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 7, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-wins-white-house-ap-fd58
df73aa677acb74fce2a69adb71f9.
11. Susan Milligan, Trump Promotes Voter Fraud Claims in 45-Minute Video Address, U.S.
NEWS (Dec. 2, 2020),
https://www.usnews.com/news/elections/articles/2020-12-02/trump-promotesvoter-fraud-claims-in-unusual-45-minute-video-address.
12. Eric Turner & Frank Bajak, Repudiating Trump, Officials Says Election 'Most Secure',
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 13, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/top-officials-elections-most-secure66f9361084ccbc461e3bbf42861057a5; Arielle Mitropoulos & Will McDuffie, State Officials Say
They're Baffled, Offended by False Election Claims, ABC NEWS (Nov. 17, 2020),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/state-officials-theyre-baffled-offended-false-electionclaims/story?id=74243567.
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of significant fraud.13 President Trump fired Krebs within the week. 14 Later,
Attorney General William Barr, one of President Trump's most ardent
supporters in the Executive Branch, likewise stated that he saw no evidence
of widespread voter fraud after a Department of Justice investigation.15 The
President pushed Barr out of the Administration shortly thereafter. 16
Beyond the dueling public statements about election fraud, President
Trump's legal team filed lawsuit after lawsuit seeking to prevent
finalization of the election's results. They brought multiple suits in each of
the
battleground
states-Arizona,
Georgia,
Michigan,
Nevada,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin-that President Trump lost but realistically
hoped to win." In each suit, the President's lawyers failed to present
adequate evidence of fraud or legal arguments for overturning the apparent
results of the vote. 18 President Trump and his legal team lost in nearly every
case-upwards of 50-including at the United States Supreme Court. 19 The
State of Texas lead another suit against several other states in an effort to
use the constitutional path of original Supreme Court jurisdiction to skip the
lower courts, but within days the Supreme Court rejected that attempt as
well. 20
Finally, driven by the volume and frequency of his public claims about
a stolen election, and the foundering litigation strategy, President Trump
pursued political and quasi-political options. Trump sought to prevent
certification of votes by wooing Republican members of certification

Courtney Norris, As Trump Continues to Push False Claims of Fraud Top Officials Says
Was Most
Secure
in History,
PUB.
BROAD.
SERV.
(Nov.
12,
2020),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/as- trump- continues- to-push- false- clai ms- of-fraud-top- official ssay-election-was-most- secure-in-history.
14. Courtney Norris, Trump's Firing of Top Election Security Official Unsettles Lawmakers,
PUB. BROAD. SERV. (Nov. 19, 2020), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trumps-firing-of-topelection-security-official-unsettles-lawmakers.
15. Katherine Faulders & Alexander Mallin, Barr Had "Intense" Meeting with Trump After
AG's Interview Undercutting Voter Fraud Claims: Sources, ABC NEWS (Dec. 2, 2020),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/barr-intense-meeting-trump-ags-interview-undercuttingvoter/story?id=74516139.
16. See Allie Malloy et. al., Attorney General William Barr Resigns, CNN, https://www.cnn.
com/2020/12/14/politics/william-barr-out-as-attorney-general/index.html (last updated Dec. 15, 2020).
17. Emily Bazelon, Trump Is Not Doing Well with His Election Lawsuits. Here's a Rundown.,
N.Y.
TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/13/us/politics/trump-election-lawsuits.html
(last
updated Nov. 25, 2020).
18. Id.
19. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Rejects Republican Challenge to Pennsylvania Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/08/us/supreme-court-republican-challenge-pennsylvaniavote.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage (last updated Dec. 10. 2020).
20. Texas v. Pennsylvania, 141 S. Ct. 1230 (2020).
13.

Election
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bodies.21 When that failed, the President begged Republican-controlled
state legislatures to select electors to the Electoral College who would vote
for him, despite the official vote tally in their state. 22 That political strategy
was dead on arrival.23 Finally, in a move with more precedent, but never
with success, President Trump hoped his allies in Congress would
challenge the final certification of the Electoral College vote.24 Persuading a
member of each the House and Senate to participate in such a challenge
was easy, but gathering a majority of Congress to support the challenge a
longshot.25 After both Senator Mitch McConnell, as the leader of the Senate
Republicans, and Vice President Mike Pence, as the Senate's presiding
officers, made clear that Congress would not overturn the results of the
election, President Trump turned to mob violence. 26 Although people died
while a mob attempted to overthrow Congress on behalf of President
Trump, even political violence could not change the election results.27
This four-ring circus of rhetorical, legal, political, and militant
showmanship amounted to nothing in terms of overturning the election, but
it will have lasting implications for public trust in government. For those
who are sure their candidate won the election but was nonetheless denied
the Presidency, the system failed both miserably and spectacularly. Putting
aside the problem that these complaints are entirely meritless, governance
does not rest on reality; it rests on belief, and there remains widespread
belief that some conspiracy ripped leadership away from their preferred
candidate and handed it an imposter.

21. Tom Hamburger et al., Trump Invites Michigan Republican Leaders to Meet Him at White
House as He Escalates Attempts to Overturn Election Results, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/ 11/1 9/wayne-county-rescind-certifying-election/.
22. See Deanna Paul, Trump Campaign Wants States to Override Electoral Votes for Biden. Is
That Possible?, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 21, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-campaign-wantsstates-to-override-electoral-votes-for-biden-is-that-possibe- 11605973695 ("Trump campaign lawyers
say Republican-controlled legislatures should use their legislative powers to set aside vote results
favoring Mr. Biden and appoint electors to cast votes for Mr. Trump when the Electoral College meets
on Dec. 14.").
23. Id.
24. Kyle Cheney & Melanie Zanona, How Trump's Allies Could Take One Last Shot to
Overturn the Election, POLITICO
(Nov.
30,
2020),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/11/30/republic
ans-overturn-electoral-college-441459.
25. See id. (explaining how Senate Republicans do not have enough members who would be
willing to challenge election results).
26. Ashley Parker, Pence and McConnell Defy Trump-After Years of Subservience, WASH.
POST (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/pence-mcconnell-trump/2021/01/06/b7a
a5c le-503b-1leb-bda4-615aaefd0555_story.html.
27. Mob Attack Incited by Trump, Delays Election Certification, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.n
ytimes.com/live/2021/01/06/us/electoral-vote (last updated Jan. 20, 2021).
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This imposter, President Biden, is illegitimate in the minds of these
doubters because he did not actually earn a majority of support from the
American people. The problem here is that even if the conspiracy theorists
had all their facts right-and millions of fraudulent votes stole the election
from President Trump-the constitutional system hints, but does not
require, popular support for a president. 28 Each state can establish its own
system for selecting electors to the Electoral College. 29 The Constitution
does not require that electors vote for the presidential candidate who wins
the most votes in a given state. 30 Regardless of how states select their
electors and regardless of which candidate the Electoral College selects,
Congress must certify the final tally and the law allows members of
Congress to challenge that certification and trigger political debate. 31 In
short, elections are paramount. They are the unique spark that ignites
democratic government, and they are essential to a functioning democracy.
And yet, elections alone are not democracy.
Elections may be the engine of democracy, but governing needs more
than an engine: it needs wheels to move forward. The political and judicial
processes may be those wheels and in the case of the 2020 presidential
election, even if a vast conspiracy stole President Trump's votes (it did not,
of course), the legal and political components retain their own, nonmajoritarian, validity. If this assertion, downplaying the role of
majoritarianism in democracy, gives you pause, you are not alone.
Enshrining majoritarian vote counting as the entirety of a democratic
system is nothing new.
Certainly, majoritarianism provides impulse for policymaking,
aggregating individual votes to create some picture of widespread policy
preferences. 32 And certainly the ability for voters to "throw the bums out"
creates some degree of accountability between voters and elected officials,
at least in theory. The theoretical basis for majoritarian supremacy is
understandable. But it is not clear that the constitutional or practical basis is
so overpowering. At least in the legal realm, the singular devotion to
majoritarianism at the expense of other aspects of good governance began

28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. See also id. amends. XII, XX.
29. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
30. Id.
31. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2021).
32. See Joshua Ulan Galperin, The Death of Administrative Democracy, 82 U. PITT. L. REV. 1,
56-57 (2020) [hereinafter Galperin, The Death ofAdministrative Democracy] (explaining how officials
elected by majoritarian elections are given powers to appoint and monitor unelected officials, thereby at
least theoretically building a government from the desires of the majority).

568

Vermont Law Review

[Vol. 45:563

in earnest only about 60 years ago.33 According to Professor Lisa Bressman,
it was the publication of Alexander Bickel's book, The Least Dangerous
Branch, that persuaded many to second-guess the role of unelected
decisionmakers, particularly federal judges.3 4 Bickel argued that judges are
suspect because they serve lifetime appointments and have attenuated
connections to voters.35

From there, majoritarianism snowballed. Judges are unelected, but they
are not the only ones. Save the President, the entirety of the Executive
Branch is unelected according to pretty much every commentator and,
importantly, the Supreme Court. 36 If majoritarianism is the sine qua non of
legitimate governance, then, by volume at least, most of the federal
government is illegitimate. As I will explain, the majority of the federal
government is not illegitimate. But recognizing the reality that most of the
government is indeed unelected, Congress has at times tried to impose
majoritarianism on executive institutions other than the presidency. It has
not worked.
At the start of the New Deal, the Great Depression forced Congress
and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to impose new
regulation on farmers in order to stabilize the agricultural economy. 37 The
general regulatory scheme involved paying farmers to reduce their
production, thereby reducing supply and raising prices. 38 There were
several practical challenges to this strategy. First, farmers had always seen
themselves as fiercely independent and skeptical of government
intervention. 39 Second, to the extent farmers were willing to accept the need
for some collective economic program, USDA had, to this point, always
been a research and education agency without the resources or experience
to implement the regulations necessary to revive the farm economy. 40 Thus,
to build support for the new regulations and implement these regulations
effectively, Congress and USDA decided rules should not come down from
Washington, but should instead come up from the farmers themselves. 41 To
33. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 461, 479-80 (2003).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 480 (describing Bickel's view that judicial review writ-large is difficult to justify in a
majoritarian democracy).
36. Galperin, The Death of Administrative Democracy, supra note 32, at 2.
37. Joshua Ulan Galperin, The Life of Administrative Democracy, 108 GEo. L.J. 1213, 122122 (2020) [hereinafter Galperin, The Life of Administrative Democracy].
38. Id. at 1222.
39. Id. at 1233.
40. See id. at 1222.
41. See id. at 1223 (noting that up until this point the lack of long-term connection between
administrators and farmers created tension).
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advance this strategy, they settled on something completely new:
administrative elections.
Congress and the USDA established a system in which farmers would
vote for other farmers to administer the new agricultural laws. 42 These
county agriculture committees were the first and only experiment in the
United States with "administrative democracy" and they still exist today. 43
In almost every county in the country, farmers are eligible to vote for and
serve on these administrative committees. 44 Congress and the USDA
develop the outlines of policy and the local committees fill in the details. 45
In the early days, these elected committees were primarily responsible for
running the supply management programs, which involved measuring crop
acreage, setting production limits, confirming that farmers were staying
within allotments, and delivering payments. 46 These responsibilities have
waxed and waned over the years, but they have always included
paradigmatic administrative policymaking and adjudication. For instance,
today, elected committee responsibilities include jurisdiction-wide
policymaking, such as setting a "final planting date," which indicate a
threshold date for planting crops. 47 If a farmer plants a crop after the
committee-designated date, that farmer is not eligible for certain federal
payments. 48 In addition, the elected committees are responsible for making
individualized judgements about when farmers did plant various crops and
other matters of farmer eligibility for federal programs. 49 These
responsibilities are esoteric insofar as they are limited to local and on-theground farming practices, but they are also broadly important as they
govern the ground floor of food policy in this country.
Especially given their foundational role, the fact that these farmer
committees are elected is not a mere curiosity. There are nearly 8,000
elected farmers making policy on nearly 3,000 committees. 50 Each
committee is composed of three to five elected members who must
participate in some federal farm programs and operate a farm within the

42. Id.
43. Id. at 1217-18.
44. Id. at 1219-20 (explaining how these county agriculture committees serve as localized
outposts of federal agencies, geographically divided according to county boundaries or smaller areas
within a given county).
45. Id. at 1225-26.
46. See id. at 1222-23 (identifying the need for someone to enforce these programs so that the
supply could be held at a lower level and the crop prices could therefore increase).
47. Id. at 1228.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1216.
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committee's jurisdiction.5 1 The voters are held to the same eligibility
requirements.52 Elected committee members serve three-year terms and can
serve up to three consecutive terms.53 They are eligible to serve again after
sitting out for at least one term.5 4 Importantly, it is the elections and term-

limits that define who serves and when they serve. Unlike every other
officer in the Executive Branch, another government official does not
appoint these elected farmers to their offices or have the power to remove
them. Only the voters and term limits have that power, making this a unique
example of majoritarian administration in a government where every other
unit of the Executive Branch is responsive, in some combination, to
Congress, the President, or high-level presidential appointees.55
Rather than stimulating good farm governance, the unique electoral
system has led to racial segregation, inept administration, and disinterest. 56
It is also unconstitutional.57 As one might have expected from a pure
majoritarian system, the majority has used its largely unconstrained
electoral authority to maintain power. The committee system has
disenfranchised Black farmers (in particular, though not exclusively) and to
distribute information, money, and government support based on personal
relationships and preferences rather than more apolitical and equitable
considerations. 58 In the recent past, Congress has made a notable effort to
reduce this discriminatory exertion of power, but the crux of that effort has
limited the bare majoritarian structure of the committees by, for instance,
allowing the Secretary of USDA to appoint representatives of
underrepresented farmers to the otherwise elected committees. Beyond
racism, analysts have, time and again, criticized the committees for simply

51. Id. at 1220.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. In fact, USDA regulations purport to allow the Deputy Administrator of the Farm Service
Agency to remove committee members for certain bad behavior after a trial-like process, but those
regulations are likely invalid. Galperin, The Death of Administrative Democracy, supra note 32 at 2627.
56. Id. at 1242.
57. See Galperin, The Death of Administrative Democracy, supra note 32, at 36-40 (arguing
that Supreme Court doctrine around appointment and removal would invalidate the process for
appointing and removing committee members because the committees are Officers of the United States,
but they are not appointed according to the Appointments Clause nor removable by the President or a
presidential appointee).
58. See Galperin, The Life ofAdministrative Democracy, supra note 37, at 1240-42 (describing
how committee administrators were able to control which farmers received relevant information and
resources-often, for example, directing funds to the landowners rather than the tenant farmers, who
were mostly Black).
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being bad at their jobs. 59 This should come as little surprise since elections
are most likely to select for popularity rather than administrative skills. Of
course, one could say the same thing about congressional or presidential
elections, but Congress designs policy, which the president implements
using a vast array of experts. Neither Congress nor the President is
practically responsible for day-to-day operations. However, the
incongruence of elections for selecting administrators may not be the only
reason the farmer committees have done a poor job of implementing farm
programs. Too few farmers have shown interest in serving on or voting for
farmer committees, providing only a small pool of candidates from which
to choose and an uncompetitive selection process. Voter turnout for these
farmer elections ranges from around 4-15 percent. 60 In one instance, there
were apparently more candidates than voters. 61
Finally, the elected farmer committees are unconstitutional. The
Constitution provides clear guidelines for appointment of officers of the
United States. Depending on the exact role of the officers, the President
may appoint with or without Senate confirmation, presidentially appointed
agency heads may appoint, or Article III judges may appoint. 62 The farmer
committees are indeed officers because they carry out statutory duties with
"significant discretion." 63 But the committees are "appointed" by votersnot the president, department heads, or judges. This is plainly
unconstitutional. Moreover, while the Constitution does not provide direct
rules about removing officers from their posts, the Supreme Court has made
clear the President, or somebody the President controls, must have the
power to remove administrative officers. 64 The electoral scheme lodges
removal power only in the farm voters-not the President or a presidential
appointee. This is yet another constitutional weakness of the electoral
system.

59. See id. at 1247-49 (noting that, although the farmers brought their agricultural knowledge
and experience to the committees, most of the farmers were not similarly knowledgeable or skilled in
administering a government program).
60. Id. at 1250.
61. Id. at 1250 n.308.
62. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
63. Lucia v. S.E.C., 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2052 (2018) (quoting Freytag v. C.I.R., 501 U.S. 868, 882
(1991)); accord Galperin, The Death of Administrative Democracy, supra note 32, at 39 ("Because the
[farmer] committees' authority goes well beyond the authority of other administrators that the Supreme
Court has already ruled are 'officers .... .').
64. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010) (citations
omitted) (holding that the President must have removal authority over an administrator or over that
administrator's supervisor); Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197
(2020) (citations omitted) (holding that when an agency has a single administrator at its head, the
President must have unbound authority to remove that administrator).
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The reasons for these failures and the constitutional frailty are
complex, but they all stem, in part, from the mistaken belief that what
makes a robust democracy is simply majoritarian leadership. To the
contrary, robust democracy is only partly majoritarianism. In addition to
elections, we should also demand opportunities for individual participation,
transparent reason-giving, and careful deliberation. These are not vague
preferences but constitutional ideals. Majoritarianism, as I have already
described, is the electoral process of aggregating individual votes to drive
decision-making or hold officials accountable. There is clearly a
majoritarian demand in the Constitution. For instance, Article I provides
that members of the House of Representative are chosen by a vote 65 and
that the House and Senate operate by majority rule. 66 But this is not the full
scope of constitutional decision-making. Individual participation is also
central. The First Amendment, for example, provides a right of individuals
to petition government regardless of their standing in a political minority or
majority. 67 Article III creates a Judicial Branch that will hear individual
complaints under the law without direct majoritarian influence. 68 The
majoritarian aspect of democracy takes a sweeping survey to animate
government, but the individual function protects classically liberal notions
of independence even in a system with collective majoritarianism.
The majoritarian and individualist qualities of democracy account for
the idea that each person has pre-political opinions on which they must be
able to act in a just political system. Each of us can vote, petition, or sue to
champion our preferences, but voting, petitioning, and suing are not ideal
avenues for dynamic expression and generation of preferences. The second
two democratic qualities-reason giving and deliberation-create
opportunities for people to evaluate and spawn new preferences in a more
collective governing enterprise. Reason giving means that decision-making
is tethered to explanations rather than unadorned edict. Decisionmakers
must explain their purpose. Constitutionally, mandatory reason giving is
evident in, for instance, the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a search
or seizure be based on reason or the Due Process Clauses' demands that
accusations and reasons precede a deprivation of life, liberty, or property. 69
Finally, the democratic necessity of deliberation simply asserts that

65.
66.
members).
67.
1538, 1559
68.
69.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
See, e.g., id. art. I,

§ 5,

cl. 2 (providing for a two-thirds majority process for expelling

Maggie McKinley, Petitioning and the Making of the Administrative State, 127 YALE L.J.
(2018).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
Galperin, The Death of Administrative Democracy, supra note 32, at 53.
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coercive decisions flow from consideration and debate. Giving reasons
alone is not sufficient. There must be an opportunity to reflect on and judge
those reasons. The Sixth Amendment's procedures for criminal trials,
including public hearings, right to witnesses, and, ultimately, a jury, are
transparent processes to assure deliberation on evidence. 70 The larger
structures of bicameralism and presentment are, in the words of Chief
Justice Burger writing for a majority of the Supreme Court: "[An]
unmistakable expression of a determination that legislation by the national
Congress be a step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative process."71
While the 2020 election seems to have deeply damaged the democratic
system-and without a doubt it has, to some, seriously undermined trust in
the electoral system-the 2020 election, and the aftermath, are also
evidence that a more robust democracy is at work and working somewhat
well. In this frantic, obsessively scrutinized, and exhausting process, we
have indeed seen all four democratic components: majoritarianism,
individualism, reason giving, and deliberation. The election itself, of
course, is vital majoritarianism. But it is not just voting for a president. In
each state elected officials oversee aspects of voting. 72 The Electors in the
Electoral College participate in their own majoritarian vote when they
actually cast their ballots for President. 73 The House and Senate use
majoritarian processes to certify the Electoral College vote. 74 Even the
polycentric constitutional structure, in some states, reinforces the role of
majoritarianism. In Georgia, for example, the Governor and Secretary of
State are independently elected to carry out distinct tasks among which are
oversight and certification of the voting in that state. 75 President Trump's
lawsuits represent a powerful tool for prosecuting individual demands.
Some of these suits challenged that the vote counting did not fairly
represent actual majoritarian preferences, but others, such as a lawsuit in
Wisconsin, argued the law should forbid counting certain votes despite an
admission that the votes did represent the actual will of voters. 76 In other
words, the courts provided a forum for individual grievance in the face of
majoritarian preference.

70. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
71. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
72. See Roucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2495 (2019) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 4, cl. 1) (discussing state legislatures powers in relation to congressional elections).
73. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
74. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2021).
75. See GA. CONST. art. II, § III, para. I (investing the Secretary of State with independent
election oversight authority).
76. See Complaint at 25-27, Trump v. Evers, No. 2020AP1971-OA, 2020 LEXIS 191 (Wis.
Dec. 3, 2020) (arguing that certain absentee votes should not be counted).
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In the end, the pursuit of individualist justice through the court system
failed due, in large part, to the democratic plea for reason giving. Courts
require reasoning to justify judicial action and President Trump's lawyers
were unable to muster any effective reasons (read: evidence) for changing
the initial vote counts. Courts not only demand reasons, they also give
reasons. Courts offered thorough explanations for their decisions and, in the
rare instances of dissents favoring President Trump's claims, dissenting
justices also explained their reasons. 7 Moreover, the congressional
certification process requires express reasoning. 78 If a Representative and a
Senator object to final certification, the law requires an objection in writing
and that the writing state a clear reason for the objection. That reason is
then the basis for a deliberative process. 79 After the House and Senate
receive the reasoned objection the two chambers convene separately for
each to debate the objection. 80 Throughout the electoral process, one
understandably seen as a majoritarian, there is ample evidence of a robust
and complete democracy beyond simple majoritarianism,
with
individualism, reason giving, and deliberation serving important roles. This
is exactly as it should be.
But oh boy, this high theory about the meaning of democracy and how
it is interwoven even through a difficult presidential election does not
provide much satisfaction when it appears the nation is pulling apart at
every seam. The vote count, state certifications, Electoral College vote,
Supreme Court orders, this does not appear to change any minds or stem the
literal flow of blood. The hatred, distrust, and inability to even
communicate runs deep and may be this country's undoing. Things are
bleak. Perhaps despair is in order. But this is no reason not to celebrate the
systems that do, in fact, work. Systems that can maintain stability despite
venomous rhetorical, legal, political, and physical attacks. Because our
constitutional democracy derives power from several sources of
legitimacy-majoritarianism,
individualism,
reason
giving,
and
deliberation-venomous attacks are not enough to destroy it. There must be
near consensus to do away with robust democracy. Today, there is
surprisingly widespread objection to the way our democracy functions, but
there is no consensus that it has failed. Indeed, the Trump Administration
challenged notions of good governance from beginning to end, and in the
end, challenged the very democratic basis of our government. People are
not behaving as they should, but the system still is.
77. Trump v. Evers, No. 2020AP1971-OA, 2020 LEXIS 191, at 4 (Wis. Dec. 3, 2020).

78. 3 U.S.C. § 15.
79. Id.
80. Id.

